Recent Decisions - State and Federal: D.C. Adopts New Test for Insanity Defense by Ross, John Jeffrey
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 8
Number 1 October, 1977 Article 11
10-1977
Recent Decisions - State and Federal: D.C. Adopts
New Test for Insanity Defense
John Jeffrey Ross
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ross, John Jeffrey (1977) "Recent Decisions - State and Federal: D.C. Adopts New Test for Insanity Defense," University of Baltimore
Law Forum: Vol. 8 : No. 1 , Article 11.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol8/iss1/11
Recent Decisions 
MARYLAND, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, PENNSYLVANIA, AND VIRGINIA 
D.C. Adopts 
New Test For 
Insanity 
Defense 
by John Jeffrey Ross 
On June 29, 1971, Eddie Bethea ended 
his marriage in a straightforward manner 
by shooting his wife five times. He was 
brought to trial before the Superior Court 
of the District of Columbia and convicted 
of first degree murder after an unsuc-
cessful insanity defense. 
A panel of the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, 
Bethea I). United States, 365 A.2d 64 
(D.C. App. 1976), in one of the more sig-
nificant decisions handed down by that 
court within the past year. While refusing 
to hold that the trial court should have in-
structed the jury on the American Law In-
stitute's standard for the insanity defense 
as adopted by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit in United States I). Brawner, 153 
8.S.App.D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 (1972) 
(See MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01), the Dis-
trict of Columbia . Court of Appeals 
adopted prospectively the All standard 
for trials in the District of Columbia 
Superior Court from the date of the 
Bethea decision. Howev!'!r, the Court of 
Appeals refused to approve the 
"diminished capacity" theory expressed 
in Brawner. In addition, the court rejected 
Bethea's contention that the lower court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury that 
the government had the burden of proving 
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. 
~ THE FORUM 
THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN THE DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA 
Crucial to understanding the disposi-
tion of the first issue (involving the Court 
of Appeals' treatment of the federal circuit 
ruling in Brawner) is an appreciation of 
the unique judicial environment of the 
District of Columbia and of the District of 
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal 
Procedure Act of 1970, 83 Stat. 473 
("Court Reorganization Act.") 
There are two separate court systems in 
the District of Columbia. The first is the 
familiar federal trial and appellate court 
structure with a United States District 
Court and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
Parallel to this is the local District of Col-
umbia system with the Superior Court 
and Court of Appeals. Judges in the latter 
courts exercise general jurisdiction over 
local matters and are equivalent to the 
judiciary in state courts. The confusion 
between the two systems can be exagger-
ated because the United States articulates 
its concern for law and order in the Dis-
trict of Columbia through the District of 
Columbia Code, and the United States At-
torney has the responsibility for the 
prosecution of all major local criminal 
cases in the Superior Court. As in all 
federal districts, violations of federal law 
are prosecuted in the United States Dis-
trict Court. 
Before the Court Reorganization Act 
took effect on February 1, 1971, there 
were numerous trial courts of limited ju-
risdiction which administered District of 
Columbia law, generally misdemeanors, 
while felonies were the province of the 
U.S. District Court. These "municipal" 
courts were subject to review by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, which 
in turn acted as an intermediate appellate 
court for the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
this circuit. Decisions of the federal court 
of appeals were thus the case law for the 
District of Columbia and binding on the 
trial courts of both systems. The Court 
Reorganization Act then consolidated the 
various municipal trial courts into one 
District of Columbia Superior Court, and 
the D.C. Court of Appeals was elevated to 
the status of "court of last resort" for 
Washington, D.C. and became equal to 
the highest court of a state. After the Act's 
effective date of February 1, 1971, deci-
sions of the United States Circuit Court 
no longer constitute the case law of the 
District of Columbia although they will be 
treated "with great respect." M.A.P. I). 
Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. App. 
1971). See generally, Swain I). Pressley, 
97 S.Ct. 1224, 1226 (1977). 
In the appeal of his murder conviction, 
Bethea argued that the trial court was in-
correct in charging the jury on the in-
sanity formulation enunciated by the 
United States Court of Appeals in Durham 
I). United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 
214 F.2d 862 (1954) when that standard 
had been abandoned by the same circuit 
court in United States I). Brawner, 153 
U.S. App.D.C. 1, 471 F.2d 969 (1972). In 
rejecting this argument, the Court of Ap-
peals noted that because Brawner was 
decided after the effective date of the 
Court Reorganization Act, Durham re-
mained the law in the District of Colum-
bia at the time of Bethea's trial. The court 
stated that the Act granted jurisprudential 
independence to the District of Colum-
bia courts and that the United States 
Court of Appeals should not have the 
authority "to control the development of 
[D.C.] law indirectly by altering the roots 
from which it has evolved." Bethea v. 
United States, 365 A.2d at 71. 
INSANITY STANDARDS 
The disease-product insanity standard 
announced in Durham was succinctly 
stated by Judge Bazelon: "[A]n accused is 
not criminally responsible if his unlawful 
act was the product of mental disease or 
mental defect." 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 
240-241, 214 F.2d 862, 874-875. 
An advance over the "knowledge of 
right from wrong" test (M'Naghten's 
Case, 8 Eng.Rep. 718 [1843]) and "ir-
resistable impulse" standard (see Smith v. 
United States, 59 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 36 
F.2d 548 [1929]), the Durham rule was 
more consonant with the modern level of 
psychological theory. This standard was 
nonetheless criticized in Bethea as "sub-
ject to a misinterpretation as prescribing a 
diagnostic, rather than a moral or societal 
test." 365 A.2d at 74. The linear, direct 
relationship between disease and product 
in the Durham paradigm could well be in-
terpreted to include the criminal act with-
in the mental disease rather than charac-
terizing the mental state as the 
phenomenon affecting moral and legal 
responsibility for that act. The court in 
Bethea joined other authorities in recog-
nizing that the disease-product doctrine 
"had the ultimate practical effect of shift-
ing resolution of the ultimate issue from 
the jury to the expert witnesses." 365 
A.2d at 74 (emphasis supplied). Evidence 
on the behaviorial dysfunction could well 
be mistaken by the jury (under a disease-
product instruction) as conclusive 
testimony on the product-the criminal 
act. In this regard, the medical testimony 
of an expert witness would constitute a 
fait accompli, effectively settling the issue 
of criminal responsibility and displacing 
the jury from its consideration of the ulti-
mate issue. 
The following standard has thus been 
adopted for the courts in the District of 
Columbia: 
1 A person is not responsible for crimi-
nal conduct if at the at the time of such 
conduct as a result of a mental disease 
or defect she lacked substantial 
capacity either to recognize the 
wrongfulness of her conduct or to con-
form her conduct to the requirements 
of law. 
~,As used in this standard, the terms 
mental disease or defect" do not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only 
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct. 
365A.2d at 79. 
Despite the abandonment of the 
Durham disease-product standard, the 
court found that Bethea had not been pre-
judiced by its application at trial, noting 
that the accused-appellant had been ex-
amined under both the Durham and ALI 
(Brawner) criteria in pretrial tests and that 
the trial court provided the jury with 
"guidance as to Durham's troublesome 




The court also rejected the appellant's 
argument that evidence bearing on the 
question of insanity should also be used 
by the jury to consider the issues of "pre-
meditation, deliberation, and malice." 
365 A.2d at 83. The use of psychiatric 
testimony to indicate a defendant's men-
tal capacity sufficiently diminished to 
preclude the necessary guilty mind or in-
tent was sanctioned by the circuit court in 
United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S. App. 
D.C., at 30-34, 371 F.2d at 998-1002. 
The Bethea court concluded that 
although psychiatric testimony is logically 
relevant to the issue of mens rea, the tra-
ditional legal conception that all persons 
are capable of forming the same level of 
criminal intent does not permit a gradu-
ated scale of that intent as might be dem-
onstrated, in theory, by psychiatric evi-
denc~. In following this traditional policy, 
the court stated: 
Within the range of individuals-who are 
not 'insane', the law does not recognize 
the readily demonstrable' fad'that as 
." -, 
between individual criminal defendants 
the nature and development of their 
mental capabilities may vary greatly. 
, 365 A.2d at 87-88. 
The law will allow admission of objec-
tively demonstrable evidence such as that 
of intoxication to indicate a diminished 
intent, as such criminal intent is inferred 
from factual circumstances, and the lay 
jury need not consider any but objective 
facts in making this decision. On the other 
hand, psychiatric evidence deals with the 
"subjective" nature of the criminal mind, 
and this esoteric testimony has been held 
to lack the sufficient probative value nec-
essary for the jury to reach a conclusion 
free of prejudice or undue technical per-
suasion. 
A further concern of the court was that 
while the consequence of a successful in-
sanity defense is therapeutic confinement 
(see 24 D.C.Code §§301[d] and [ell, an 
acquittal by a jury impressed by technical 
evidence admitted to explain criminal in-
tent in subjective terms results in freedom 
for an accused who would otherwise be 
found guilty by traditional standards. 
INSANITY: BURDEN OF PROOF 
The third major issue facing the court 
was whether the requirement that the ac-
cused must establish his insanity defense 
by a preponderance of the evidence, pur-
suant to 24 D.C.Code §301 (j), was con-
stitutionally offensive. 
By resolving this issue in favor of the 
government, the court stated that this 
burden of proof continues to be accept-
able in the face of Mullany v. Wilbur, 421 
U.S. 684 (1975) because the issue of in-
sanity is to be considered by the trier of 
fact after the government proves all of the 
elements of the offense beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. 365 A.2d at 94. As authority, 
the court relied on Leland v. Oregon, 343 
U.S. 790 (1952) where an Oregon statute 
requiring the accused to establish his in-
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt with-
stood a constitutional challenge. See 
Mullany v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705 
(concurring opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist); see also, Patterson v. New York, 
97 S.Ct. 2319 (1977). 
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